World War I as a war of liberals against authoritarians?












2















An essay by Robert Kagan in the Washington Post, March 14, 2019, argues for rethinking the big theme of 20th-century history as a struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism, and for an interpretation of authoritarianism as explicitly ideological. In particular, he argues that




World War I, fought mainly in the trenches along the Western Front from 1914 to 1918, was very much a war between authoritarianism and liberalism.




This seems like a very novel interpretation to me, but maybe my high school education in 1980 was biased or is now out of date. Is this picture well-supported by the historical record? Is Kagan stretching a point too far?



My picture of World War I had been that it was not an ideological conflict but rather an unintended consequence of the existence of secret treaties that allowed a trivial assassination to become amplified into a world-wide conflict. I would have also thought of it as being connected to colonialism. I'm an American, and when I think of Woodrow Wilson, I don't think of classical liberalism — I think of the Palmer Raids, hardcore racism and segregation, and the East St. Louis massacres. I suppose World War I was a war to make the world safe for capital in the US and Britain, which does align with the Hayek-style notion of classical liberalism, but Kagan seems to want to disassociate liberalism-authoritarianism from right-left economic policy.










share|improve this question




















  • 3





    Imperial Russia wasn't particularly liberal, so I don't see how you can claim it started out as such a thing.

    – Steven Burnap
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    @StevenBurnap: I don't understand your comment. I'm not claiming anything. I'm asking for an evaluation of Kagan's claims. And why "started out as?"

    – Ben Crowell
    3 hours ago











  • Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra examines some of the 19th century ideological motivators I think Kagan is getting at, and their relevance nationalist movements today, albeit in somewhat different terms. I'll look forward to seeing a complete answer in terms of WWI specifically.

    – Era
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    It's as good an oversimplification as most of them...which is to say "not really very good" As long as you ignore the parts that don't fit, it works pretty well as an organizing principle.

    – Mark Olson
    1 hour ago








  • 2





    Kagan seems to be trying to force the past into a shape that supports his ideas about the present. He isn't convincing me with this argument.

    – John Dallman
    1 hour ago
















2















An essay by Robert Kagan in the Washington Post, March 14, 2019, argues for rethinking the big theme of 20th-century history as a struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism, and for an interpretation of authoritarianism as explicitly ideological. In particular, he argues that




World War I, fought mainly in the trenches along the Western Front from 1914 to 1918, was very much a war between authoritarianism and liberalism.




This seems like a very novel interpretation to me, but maybe my high school education in 1980 was biased or is now out of date. Is this picture well-supported by the historical record? Is Kagan stretching a point too far?



My picture of World War I had been that it was not an ideological conflict but rather an unintended consequence of the existence of secret treaties that allowed a trivial assassination to become amplified into a world-wide conflict. I would have also thought of it as being connected to colonialism. I'm an American, and when I think of Woodrow Wilson, I don't think of classical liberalism — I think of the Palmer Raids, hardcore racism and segregation, and the East St. Louis massacres. I suppose World War I was a war to make the world safe for capital in the US and Britain, which does align with the Hayek-style notion of classical liberalism, but Kagan seems to want to disassociate liberalism-authoritarianism from right-left economic policy.










share|improve this question




















  • 3





    Imperial Russia wasn't particularly liberal, so I don't see how you can claim it started out as such a thing.

    – Steven Burnap
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    @StevenBurnap: I don't understand your comment. I'm not claiming anything. I'm asking for an evaluation of Kagan's claims. And why "started out as?"

    – Ben Crowell
    3 hours ago











  • Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra examines some of the 19th century ideological motivators I think Kagan is getting at, and their relevance nationalist movements today, albeit in somewhat different terms. I'll look forward to seeing a complete answer in terms of WWI specifically.

    – Era
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    It's as good an oversimplification as most of them...which is to say "not really very good" As long as you ignore the parts that don't fit, it works pretty well as an organizing principle.

    – Mark Olson
    1 hour ago








  • 2





    Kagan seems to be trying to force the past into a shape that supports his ideas about the present. He isn't convincing me with this argument.

    – John Dallman
    1 hour ago














2












2








2








An essay by Robert Kagan in the Washington Post, March 14, 2019, argues for rethinking the big theme of 20th-century history as a struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism, and for an interpretation of authoritarianism as explicitly ideological. In particular, he argues that




World War I, fought mainly in the trenches along the Western Front from 1914 to 1918, was very much a war between authoritarianism and liberalism.




This seems like a very novel interpretation to me, but maybe my high school education in 1980 was biased or is now out of date. Is this picture well-supported by the historical record? Is Kagan stretching a point too far?



My picture of World War I had been that it was not an ideological conflict but rather an unintended consequence of the existence of secret treaties that allowed a trivial assassination to become amplified into a world-wide conflict. I would have also thought of it as being connected to colonialism. I'm an American, and when I think of Woodrow Wilson, I don't think of classical liberalism — I think of the Palmer Raids, hardcore racism and segregation, and the East St. Louis massacres. I suppose World War I was a war to make the world safe for capital in the US and Britain, which does align with the Hayek-style notion of classical liberalism, but Kagan seems to want to disassociate liberalism-authoritarianism from right-left economic policy.










share|improve this question
















An essay by Robert Kagan in the Washington Post, March 14, 2019, argues for rethinking the big theme of 20th-century history as a struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism, and for an interpretation of authoritarianism as explicitly ideological. In particular, he argues that




World War I, fought mainly in the trenches along the Western Front from 1914 to 1918, was very much a war between authoritarianism and liberalism.




This seems like a very novel interpretation to me, but maybe my high school education in 1980 was biased or is now out of date. Is this picture well-supported by the historical record? Is Kagan stretching a point too far?



My picture of World War I had been that it was not an ideological conflict but rather an unintended consequence of the existence of secret treaties that allowed a trivial assassination to become amplified into a world-wide conflict. I would have also thought of it as being connected to colonialism. I'm an American, and when I think of Woodrow Wilson, I don't think of classical liberalism — I think of the Palmer Raids, hardcore racism and segregation, and the East St. Louis massacres. I suppose World War I was a war to make the world safe for capital in the US and Britain, which does align with the Hayek-style notion of classical liberalism, but Kagan seems to want to disassociate liberalism-authoritarianism from right-left economic policy.







20th-century world-war-one revisionism






share|improve this question















share|improve this question













share|improve this question




share|improve this question








edited 2 hours ago









Rodrigo de Azevedo

255113




255113










asked 4 hours ago









Ben CrowellBen Crowell

3,36812039




3,36812039








  • 3





    Imperial Russia wasn't particularly liberal, so I don't see how you can claim it started out as such a thing.

    – Steven Burnap
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    @StevenBurnap: I don't understand your comment. I'm not claiming anything. I'm asking for an evaluation of Kagan's claims. And why "started out as?"

    – Ben Crowell
    3 hours ago











  • Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra examines some of the 19th century ideological motivators I think Kagan is getting at, and their relevance nationalist movements today, albeit in somewhat different terms. I'll look forward to seeing a complete answer in terms of WWI specifically.

    – Era
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    It's as good an oversimplification as most of them...which is to say "not really very good" As long as you ignore the parts that don't fit, it works pretty well as an organizing principle.

    – Mark Olson
    1 hour ago








  • 2





    Kagan seems to be trying to force the past into a shape that supports his ideas about the present. He isn't convincing me with this argument.

    – John Dallman
    1 hour ago














  • 3





    Imperial Russia wasn't particularly liberal, so I don't see how you can claim it started out as such a thing.

    – Steven Burnap
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    @StevenBurnap: I don't understand your comment. I'm not claiming anything. I'm asking for an evaluation of Kagan's claims. And why "started out as?"

    – Ben Crowell
    3 hours ago











  • Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra examines some of the 19th century ideological motivators I think Kagan is getting at, and their relevance nationalist movements today, albeit in somewhat different terms. I'll look forward to seeing a complete answer in terms of WWI specifically.

    – Era
    3 hours ago






  • 1





    It's as good an oversimplification as most of them...which is to say "not really very good" As long as you ignore the parts that don't fit, it works pretty well as an organizing principle.

    – Mark Olson
    1 hour ago








  • 2





    Kagan seems to be trying to force the past into a shape that supports his ideas about the present. He isn't convincing me with this argument.

    – John Dallman
    1 hour ago








3




3





Imperial Russia wasn't particularly liberal, so I don't see how you can claim it started out as such a thing.

– Steven Burnap
3 hours ago





Imperial Russia wasn't particularly liberal, so I don't see how you can claim it started out as such a thing.

– Steven Burnap
3 hours ago




1




1





@StevenBurnap: I don't understand your comment. I'm not claiming anything. I'm asking for an evaluation of Kagan's claims. And why "started out as?"

– Ben Crowell
3 hours ago





@StevenBurnap: I don't understand your comment. I'm not claiming anything. I'm asking for an evaluation of Kagan's claims. And why "started out as?"

– Ben Crowell
3 hours ago













Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra examines some of the 19th century ideological motivators I think Kagan is getting at, and their relevance nationalist movements today, albeit in somewhat different terms. I'll look forward to seeing a complete answer in terms of WWI specifically.

– Era
3 hours ago





Age of Anger by Pankaj Mishra examines some of the 19th century ideological motivators I think Kagan is getting at, and their relevance nationalist movements today, albeit in somewhat different terms. I'll look forward to seeing a complete answer in terms of WWI specifically.

– Era
3 hours ago




1




1





It's as good an oversimplification as most of them...which is to say "not really very good" As long as you ignore the parts that don't fit, it works pretty well as an organizing principle.

– Mark Olson
1 hour ago







It's as good an oversimplification as most of them...which is to say "not really very good" As long as you ignore the parts that don't fit, it works pretty well as an organizing principle.

– Mark Olson
1 hour ago






2




2





Kagan seems to be trying to force the past into a shape that supports his ideas about the present. He isn't convincing me with this argument.

– John Dallman
1 hour ago





Kagan seems to be trying to force the past into a shape that supports his ideas about the present. He isn't convincing me with this argument.

– John Dallman
1 hour ago










1 Answer
1






active

oldest

votes


















5














Seeing WWI as an ideological battle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes requires hindsight and taking the Western perspective and adjusting your lenses for what was considered "liberal democracy" at the time. While certainly empires fell and new republics rose, other empires gained, and people continued to be oppressed. When you start to look at WWI in the moment and in detail it's less clear. When you look at WWI from the perspective of the world outside the victorious Allies and remove the "liberal for the time" distortion things start to get a lot less rosy.



Maintaining the status quo



The primary drive for WWI was the rise of a unified Germany in 1871 overnight destabilizing the balance of power Europe. Previously the UK, France, and Russia were centers of economic and military power with fractured central Europe and stagnant Austria-Hungary acting as a buffer zone. Now Germany is a new center of power right in the middle. Born in the defeat of France, and later getting into a naval arms race with Britain, Germany scares the pants off both France and Britain.



They held it together for 40 years: emperor to emperor; monarch to monarch... and France. The monarchies of Britain, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary all had a vested interest in keeping the status quo to remain in power. France had a vested interest in countering its mortal enemy: Germany. Eventually it fell apart as Germany got too ambitious. France and Russia allied against Germany. That opportunistic alliance between liberal France and autocratic Russia against autocratic Germany further complicates the narrative.



Even as WWI is breaking out we see frantic shuttle diplomacy happening right up to the last moment to prevent a general European war. None of the powers are saber rattling for general war, it's all about a power grab in Serbia. Even Germany, who was goading Austria-Hungary, hoped for a quick victory against Serbia before Russia could mobilize.



Liberal democracies?



Russia is the most obvious thorn in this idea. Autocratic Imperial Russia in WWI are fighting on the side of... democracy? No, Imperial Russia joined WWI in a spat with Austria-Hungary over who gets to protect dominate the Slavs. These were two autocrats going to war over who gets control. It's only after the war went horrendously badly for Russia (plus many contributing factors) that allowed a Communist revolt to take hold. Then the resulting Soviet regime is democratic in name only, it's more autocracy.



And then there's Imperial Japan, at the time just getting started on a decades long brutal occupation of Korea. They joined the war on the Allied side in a deal with the UK to protect against German Pacific raiders. Japan used this as an opportunity to grab German Pacific territories including the German occupied port of Tsingtao in China which they kept. Then they turned against China with a series of unequal treaties designed to give Japan more control.



Liberal democracy for whom?



The Third French Republic is liberal democracy... for men. The UK, a constitutional monarchy, had representation for about half the men. And in the democratic US only men could vote, and in practice often only white men.



And, oh yes, their many, many, many colonies and occupied territories. Racism appears again in the preferential treatment of mostly-white colonies. Canada and Australia, for example, had a modicum of home rule. Others like India, Indochina, and the Philippines don't get democracy until after another world war and many revolts. For them the US, UK, and France are the autocrats.



Post war winners and losers



Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for the peace following WWI made some very enlightened promises regarding the handling of occupied territories. Some were kept. Most were not. But the ideas had power.



After the Entente surrenders and the war proper is over, multiple nationalist uprisings spring up in former imperial territories. Anatolia (ie. Turkey), the Middle East, Russia, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe all expect their autonomy. While one can view the Allies support of Central European and Baltic nationalism as a blow for freedom and democracy and self-rule... when you start to look at the Allied attitude towards other regions it looks more like a cynical buffer zone against Germany and the Soviets.



East Germany, western Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were largely carved up. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary got their independence more or less by treaty and a bit of fighting. Self-rule, yes, but also convenient checks on German expansion.



Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia emerged from the chaos of German-occupied Baltic area following the collapse of both Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany. A three way brawl developed, generally, between nationalists, Soviets, and local Germans. The Allies and Whites generally threw in with the nationalists. Again, supporting self-rule, but they also act as a bulwark against Communism which scared the crap out of the Allies.



Once we look beyond keeping Germany in check, things become less rosy for the liberal democracies. In Russia we see a confused Allied intervention into the Russian civil war generally on the part of the autocratic Whites, though really against the Soviets who scare the crap out of them. We also see victorious ally autocratic Imperial Japan attempt to establish a Siberian buffer state, not very democratic. This is all in contrast to point VI.




VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.




Looking south at the Ottoman Empire, we see the Allies making promises of independence after the war if the locals would please fight the Ottomans. Meanwhile the Allies are making secret treaties to carve up the territory for themselves. The war in Europe is over, but Allied armies continue to gobble up Ottoman territory. Russia, Britain, France, Greece, and Italy are all tripping over each other in the mad scramble to lay claim to pieces of Anatolia and the Middle East for themselves. This mostly went according to plan, the Middle East was carved up into regions for the benefit of the Allies; not very democratic.



As for the Turks, point XII promised...




XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.




Instead there was a plan to carve up Anatolia with "zones of influence" and outright annexations leaving about a third of the territory for the Turks. The Turks strenuously objected to this plan that nobody consulted them about and won their independence by fighting the Allies who wanted to carve them up.



Finally, some colonies took point V to heart.




V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.




Most famously Hi Chi Minh arrived at the Versailles Peace Conference asking for independence from France for Vietnam. He was ignored and two generations of the Indochinese would suffer for it.






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    Seeing WWI as an ideological battle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes requires hindsight and taking the Western perspective and adjusting your lenses for what was considered "liberal democracy" at the time. While certainly empires fell and new republics rose, other empires gained, and people continued to be oppressed. When you start to look at WWI in the moment and in detail it's less clear. When you look at WWI from the perspective of the world outside the victorious Allies and remove the "liberal for the time" distortion things start to get a lot less rosy.



    Maintaining the status quo



    The primary drive for WWI was the rise of a unified Germany in 1871 overnight destabilizing the balance of power Europe. Previously the UK, France, and Russia were centers of economic and military power with fractured central Europe and stagnant Austria-Hungary acting as a buffer zone. Now Germany is a new center of power right in the middle. Born in the defeat of France, and later getting into a naval arms race with Britain, Germany scares the pants off both France and Britain.



    They held it together for 40 years: emperor to emperor; monarch to monarch... and France. The monarchies of Britain, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary all had a vested interest in keeping the status quo to remain in power. France had a vested interest in countering its mortal enemy: Germany. Eventually it fell apart as Germany got too ambitious. France and Russia allied against Germany. That opportunistic alliance between liberal France and autocratic Russia against autocratic Germany further complicates the narrative.



    Even as WWI is breaking out we see frantic shuttle diplomacy happening right up to the last moment to prevent a general European war. None of the powers are saber rattling for general war, it's all about a power grab in Serbia. Even Germany, who was goading Austria-Hungary, hoped for a quick victory against Serbia before Russia could mobilize.



    Liberal democracies?



    Russia is the most obvious thorn in this idea. Autocratic Imperial Russia in WWI are fighting on the side of... democracy? No, Imperial Russia joined WWI in a spat with Austria-Hungary over who gets to protect dominate the Slavs. These were two autocrats going to war over who gets control. It's only after the war went horrendously badly for Russia (plus many contributing factors) that allowed a Communist revolt to take hold. Then the resulting Soviet regime is democratic in name only, it's more autocracy.



    And then there's Imperial Japan, at the time just getting started on a decades long brutal occupation of Korea. They joined the war on the Allied side in a deal with the UK to protect against German Pacific raiders. Japan used this as an opportunity to grab German Pacific territories including the German occupied port of Tsingtao in China which they kept. Then they turned against China with a series of unequal treaties designed to give Japan more control.



    Liberal democracy for whom?



    The Third French Republic is liberal democracy... for men. The UK, a constitutional monarchy, had representation for about half the men. And in the democratic US only men could vote, and in practice often only white men.



    And, oh yes, their many, many, many colonies and occupied territories. Racism appears again in the preferential treatment of mostly-white colonies. Canada and Australia, for example, had a modicum of home rule. Others like India, Indochina, and the Philippines don't get democracy until after another world war and many revolts. For them the US, UK, and France are the autocrats.



    Post war winners and losers



    Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for the peace following WWI made some very enlightened promises regarding the handling of occupied territories. Some were kept. Most were not. But the ideas had power.



    After the Entente surrenders and the war proper is over, multiple nationalist uprisings spring up in former imperial territories. Anatolia (ie. Turkey), the Middle East, Russia, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe all expect their autonomy. While one can view the Allies support of Central European and Baltic nationalism as a blow for freedom and democracy and self-rule... when you start to look at the Allied attitude towards other regions it looks more like a cynical buffer zone against Germany and the Soviets.



    East Germany, western Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were largely carved up. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary got their independence more or less by treaty and a bit of fighting. Self-rule, yes, but also convenient checks on German expansion.



    Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia emerged from the chaos of German-occupied Baltic area following the collapse of both Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany. A three way brawl developed, generally, between nationalists, Soviets, and local Germans. The Allies and Whites generally threw in with the nationalists. Again, supporting self-rule, but they also act as a bulwark against Communism which scared the crap out of the Allies.



    Once we look beyond keeping Germany in check, things become less rosy for the liberal democracies. In Russia we see a confused Allied intervention into the Russian civil war generally on the part of the autocratic Whites, though really against the Soviets who scare the crap out of them. We also see victorious ally autocratic Imperial Japan attempt to establish a Siberian buffer state, not very democratic. This is all in contrast to point VI.




    VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.




    Looking south at the Ottoman Empire, we see the Allies making promises of independence after the war if the locals would please fight the Ottomans. Meanwhile the Allies are making secret treaties to carve up the territory for themselves. The war in Europe is over, but Allied armies continue to gobble up Ottoman territory. Russia, Britain, France, Greece, and Italy are all tripping over each other in the mad scramble to lay claim to pieces of Anatolia and the Middle East for themselves. This mostly went according to plan, the Middle East was carved up into regions for the benefit of the Allies; not very democratic.



    As for the Turks, point XII promised...




    XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.




    Instead there was a plan to carve up Anatolia with "zones of influence" and outright annexations leaving about a third of the territory for the Turks. The Turks strenuously objected to this plan that nobody consulted them about and won their independence by fighting the Allies who wanted to carve them up.



    Finally, some colonies took point V to heart.




    V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.




    Most famously Hi Chi Minh arrived at the Versailles Peace Conference asking for independence from France for Vietnam. He was ignored and two generations of the Indochinese would suffer for it.






    share|improve this answer






























      5














      Seeing WWI as an ideological battle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes requires hindsight and taking the Western perspective and adjusting your lenses for what was considered "liberal democracy" at the time. While certainly empires fell and new republics rose, other empires gained, and people continued to be oppressed. When you start to look at WWI in the moment and in detail it's less clear. When you look at WWI from the perspective of the world outside the victorious Allies and remove the "liberal for the time" distortion things start to get a lot less rosy.



      Maintaining the status quo



      The primary drive for WWI was the rise of a unified Germany in 1871 overnight destabilizing the balance of power Europe. Previously the UK, France, and Russia were centers of economic and military power with fractured central Europe and stagnant Austria-Hungary acting as a buffer zone. Now Germany is a new center of power right in the middle. Born in the defeat of France, and later getting into a naval arms race with Britain, Germany scares the pants off both France and Britain.



      They held it together for 40 years: emperor to emperor; monarch to monarch... and France. The monarchies of Britain, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary all had a vested interest in keeping the status quo to remain in power. France had a vested interest in countering its mortal enemy: Germany. Eventually it fell apart as Germany got too ambitious. France and Russia allied against Germany. That opportunistic alliance between liberal France and autocratic Russia against autocratic Germany further complicates the narrative.



      Even as WWI is breaking out we see frantic shuttle diplomacy happening right up to the last moment to prevent a general European war. None of the powers are saber rattling for general war, it's all about a power grab in Serbia. Even Germany, who was goading Austria-Hungary, hoped for a quick victory against Serbia before Russia could mobilize.



      Liberal democracies?



      Russia is the most obvious thorn in this idea. Autocratic Imperial Russia in WWI are fighting on the side of... democracy? No, Imperial Russia joined WWI in a spat with Austria-Hungary over who gets to protect dominate the Slavs. These were two autocrats going to war over who gets control. It's only after the war went horrendously badly for Russia (plus many contributing factors) that allowed a Communist revolt to take hold. Then the resulting Soviet regime is democratic in name only, it's more autocracy.



      And then there's Imperial Japan, at the time just getting started on a decades long brutal occupation of Korea. They joined the war on the Allied side in a deal with the UK to protect against German Pacific raiders. Japan used this as an opportunity to grab German Pacific territories including the German occupied port of Tsingtao in China which they kept. Then they turned against China with a series of unequal treaties designed to give Japan more control.



      Liberal democracy for whom?



      The Third French Republic is liberal democracy... for men. The UK, a constitutional monarchy, had representation for about half the men. And in the democratic US only men could vote, and in practice often only white men.



      And, oh yes, their many, many, many colonies and occupied territories. Racism appears again in the preferential treatment of mostly-white colonies. Canada and Australia, for example, had a modicum of home rule. Others like India, Indochina, and the Philippines don't get democracy until after another world war and many revolts. For them the US, UK, and France are the autocrats.



      Post war winners and losers



      Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for the peace following WWI made some very enlightened promises regarding the handling of occupied territories. Some were kept. Most were not. But the ideas had power.



      After the Entente surrenders and the war proper is over, multiple nationalist uprisings spring up in former imperial territories. Anatolia (ie. Turkey), the Middle East, Russia, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe all expect their autonomy. While one can view the Allies support of Central European and Baltic nationalism as a blow for freedom and democracy and self-rule... when you start to look at the Allied attitude towards other regions it looks more like a cynical buffer zone against Germany and the Soviets.



      East Germany, western Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were largely carved up. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary got their independence more or less by treaty and a bit of fighting. Self-rule, yes, but also convenient checks on German expansion.



      Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia emerged from the chaos of German-occupied Baltic area following the collapse of both Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany. A three way brawl developed, generally, between nationalists, Soviets, and local Germans. The Allies and Whites generally threw in with the nationalists. Again, supporting self-rule, but they also act as a bulwark against Communism which scared the crap out of the Allies.



      Once we look beyond keeping Germany in check, things become less rosy for the liberal democracies. In Russia we see a confused Allied intervention into the Russian civil war generally on the part of the autocratic Whites, though really against the Soviets who scare the crap out of them. We also see victorious ally autocratic Imperial Japan attempt to establish a Siberian buffer state, not very democratic. This is all in contrast to point VI.




      VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.




      Looking south at the Ottoman Empire, we see the Allies making promises of independence after the war if the locals would please fight the Ottomans. Meanwhile the Allies are making secret treaties to carve up the territory for themselves. The war in Europe is over, but Allied armies continue to gobble up Ottoman territory. Russia, Britain, France, Greece, and Italy are all tripping over each other in the mad scramble to lay claim to pieces of Anatolia and the Middle East for themselves. This mostly went according to plan, the Middle East was carved up into regions for the benefit of the Allies; not very democratic.



      As for the Turks, point XII promised...




      XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.




      Instead there was a plan to carve up Anatolia with "zones of influence" and outright annexations leaving about a third of the territory for the Turks. The Turks strenuously objected to this plan that nobody consulted them about and won their independence by fighting the Allies who wanted to carve them up.



      Finally, some colonies took point V to heart.




      V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.




      Most famously Hi Chi Minh arrived at the Versailles Peace Conference asking for independence from France for Vietnam. He was ignored and two generations of the Indochinese would suffer for it.






      share|improve this answer




























        5












        5








        5







        Seeing WWI as an ideological battle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes requires hindsight and taking the Western perspective and adjusting your lenses for what was considered "liberal democracy" at the time. While certainly empires fell and new republics rose, other empires gained, and people continued to be oppressed. When you start to look at WWI in the moment and in detail it's less clear. When you look at WWI from the perspective of the world outside the victorious Allies and remove the "liberal for the time" distortion things start to get a lot less rosy.



        Maintaining the status quo



        The primary drive for WWI was the rise of a unified Germany in 1871 overnight destabilizing the balance of power Europe. Previously the UK, France, and Russia were centers of economic and military power with fractured central Europe and stagnant Austria-Hungary acting as a buffer zone. Now Germany is a new center of power right in the middle. Born in the defeat of France, and later getting into a naval arms race with Britain, Germany scares the pants off both France and Britain.



        They held it together for 40 years: emperor to emperor; monarch to monarch... and France. The monarchies of Britain, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary all had a vested interest in keeping the status quo to remain in power. France had a vested interest in countering its mortal enemy: Germany. Eventually it fell apart as Germany got too ambitious. France and Russia allied against Germany. That opportunistic alliance between liberal France and autocratic Russia against autocratic Germany further complicates the narrative.



        Even as WWI is breaking out we see frantic shuttle diplomacy happening right up to the last moment to prevent a general European war. None of the powers are saber rattling for general war, it's all about a power grab in Serbia. Even Germany, who was goading Austria-Hungary, hoped for a quick victory against Serbia before Russia could mobilize.



        Liberal democracies?



        Russia is the most obvious thorn in this idea. Autocratic Imperial Russia in WWI are fighting on the side of... democracy? No, Imperial Russia joined WWI in a spat with Austria-Hungary over who gets to protect dominate the Slavs. These were two autocrats going to war over who gets control. It's only after the war went horrendously badly for Russia (plus many contributing factors) that allowed a Communist revolt to take hold. Then the resulting Soviet regime is democratic in name only, it's more autocracy.



        And then there's Imperial Japan, at the time just getting started on a decades long brutal occupation of Korea. They joined the war on the Allied side in a deal with the UK to protect against German Pacific raiders. Japan used this as an opportunity to grab German Pacific territories including the German occupied port of Tsingtao in China which they kept. Then they turned against China with a series of unequal treaties designed to give Japan more control.



        Liberal democracy for whom?



        The Third French Republic is liberal democracy... for men. The UK, a constitutional monarchy, had representation for about half the men. And in the democratic US only men could vote, and in practice often only white men.



        And, oh yes, their many, many, many colonies and occupied territories. Racism appears again in the preferential treatment of mostly-white colonies. Canada and Australia, for example, had a modicum of home rule. Others like India, Indochina, and the Philippines don't get democracy until after another world war and many revolts. For them the US, UK, and France are the autocrats.



        Post war winners and losers



        Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for the peace following WWI made some very enlightened promises regarding the handling of occupied territories. Some were kept. Most were not. But the ideas had power.



        After the Entente surrenders and the war proper is over, multiple nationalist uprisings spring up in former imperial territories. Anatolia (ie. Turkey), the Middle East, Russia, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe all expect their autonomy. While one can view the Allies support of Central European and Baltic nationalism as a blow for freedom and democracy and self-rule... when you start to look at the Allied attitude towards other regions it looks more like a cynical buffer zone against Germany and the Soviets.



        East Germany, western Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were largely carved up. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary got their independence more or less by treaty and a bit of fighting. Self-rule, yes, but also convenient checks on German expansion.



        Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia emerged from the chaos of German-occupied Baltic area following the collapse of both Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany. A three way brawl developed, generally, between nationalists, Soviets, and local Germans. The Allies and Whites generally threw in with the nationalists. Again, supporting self-rule, but they also act as a bulwark against Communism which scared the crap out of the Allies.



        Once we look beyond keeping Germany in check, things become less rosy for the liberal democracies. In Russia we see a confused Allied intervention into the Russian civil war generally on the part of the autocratic Whites, though really against the Soviets who scare the crap out of them. We also see victorious ally autocratic Imperial Japan attempt to establish a Siberian buffer state, not very democratic. This is all in contrast to point VI.




        VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.




        Looking south at the Ottoman Empire, we see the Allies making promises of independence after the war if the locals would please fight the Ottomans. Meanwhile the Allies are making secret treaties to carve up the territory for themselves. The war in Europe is over, but Allied armies continue to gobble up Ottoman territory. Russia, Britain, France, Greece, and Italy are all tripping over each other in the mad scramble to lay claim to pieces of Anatolia and the Middle East for themselves. This mostly went according to plan, the Middle East was carved up into regions for the benefit of the Allies; not very democratic.



        As for the Turks, point XII promised...




        XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.




        Instead there was a plan to carve up Anatolia with "zones of influence" and outright annexations leaving about a third of the territory for the Turks. The Turks strenuously objected to this plan that nobody consulted them about and won their independence by fighting the Allies who wanted to carve them up.



        Finally, some colonies took point V to heart.




        V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.




        Most famously Hi Chi Minh arrived at the Versailles Peace Conference asking for independence from France for Vietnam. He was ignored and two generations of the Indochinese would suffer for it.






        share|improve this answer















        Seeing WWI as an ideological battle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes requires hindsight and taking the Western perspective and adjusting your lenses for what was considered "liberal democracy" at the time. While certainly empires fell and new republics rose, other empires gained, and people continued to be oppressed. When you start to look at WWI in the moment and in detail it's less clear. When you look at WWI from the perspective of the world outside the victorious Allies and remove the "liberal for the time" distortion things start to get a lot less rosy.



        Maintaining the status quo



        The primary drive for WWI was the rise of a unified Germany in 1871 overnight destabilizing the balance of power Europe. Previously the UK, France, and Russia were centers of economic and military power with fractured central Europe and stagnant Austria-Hungary acting as a buffer zone. Now Germany is a new center of power right in the middle. Born in the defeat of France, and later getting into a naval arms race with Britain, Germany scares the pants off both France and Britain.



        They held it together for 40 years: emperor to emperor; monarch to monarch... and France. The monarchies of Britain, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary all had a vested interest in keeping the status quo to remain in power. France had a vested interest in countering its mortal enemy: Germany. Eventually it fell apart as Germany got too ambitious. France and Russia allied against Germany. That opportunistic alliance between liberal France and autocratic Russia against autocratic Germany further complicates the narrative.



        Even as WWI is breaking out we see frantic shuttle diplomacy happening right up to the last moment to prevent a general European war. None of the powers are saber rattling for general war, it's all about a power grab in Serbia. Even Germany, who was goading Austria-Hungary, hoped for a quick victory against Serbia before Russia could mobilize.



        Liberal democracies?



        Russia is the most obvious thorn in this idea. Autocratic Imperial Russia in WWI are fighting on the side of... democracy? No, Imperial Russia joined WWI in a spat with Austria-Hungary over who gets to protect dominate the Slavs. These were two autocrats going to war over who gets control. It's only after the war went horrendously badly for Russia (plus many contributing factors) that allowed a Communist revolt to take hold. Then the resulting Soviet regime is democratic in name only, it's more autocracy.



        And then there's Imperial Japan, at the time just getting started on a decades long brutal occupation of Korea. They joined the war on the Allied side in a deal with the UK to protect against German Pacific raiders. Japan used this as an opportunity to grab German Pacific territories including the German occupied port of Tsingtao in China which they kept. Then they turned against China with a series of unequal treaties designed to give Japan more control.



        Liberal democracy for whom?



        The Third French Republic is liberal democracy... for men. The UK, a constitutional monarchy, had representation for about half the men. And in the democratic US only men could vote, and in practice often only white men.



        And, oh yes, their many, many, many colonies and occupied territories. Racism appears again in the preferential treatment of mostly-white colonies. Canada and Australia, for example, had a modicum of home rule. Others like India, Indochina, and the Philippines don't get democracy until after another world war and many revolts. For them the US, UK, and France are the autocrats.



        Post war winners and losers



        Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for the peace following WWI made some very enlightened promises regarding the handling of occupied territories. Some were kept. Most were not. But the ideas had power.



        After the Entente surrenders and the war proper is over, multiple nationalist uprisings spring up in former imperial territories. Anatolia (ie. Turkey), the Middle East, Russia, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe all expect their autonomy. While one can view the Allies support of Central European and Baltic nationalism as a blow for freedom and democracy and self-rule... when you start to look at the Allied attitude towards other regions it looks more like a cynical buffer zone against Germany and the Soviets.



        East Germany, western Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were largely carved up. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary got their independence more or less by treaty and a bit of fighting. Self-rule, yes, but also convenient checks on German expansion.



        Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia emerged from the chaos of German-occupied Baltic area following the collapse of both Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany. A three way brawl developed, generally, between nationalists, Soviets, and local Germans. The Allies and Whites generally threw in with the nationalists. Again, supporting self-rule, but they also act as a bulwark against Communism which scared the crap out of the Allies.



        Once we look beyond keeping Germany in check, things become less rosy for the liberal democracies. In Russia we see a confused Allied intervention into the Russian civil war generally on the part of the autocratic Whites, though really against the Soviets who scare the crap out of them. We also see victorious ally autocratic Imperial Japan attempt to establish a Siberian buffer state, not very democratic. This is all in contrast to point VI.




        VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.




        Looking south at the Ottoman Empire, we see the Allies making promises of independence after the war if the locals would please fight the Ottomans. Meanwhile the Allies are making secret treaties to carve up the territory for themselves. The war in Europe is over, but Allied armies continue to gobble up Ottoman territory. Russia, Britain, France, Greece, and Italy are all tripping over each other in the mad scramble to lay claim to pieces of Anatolia and the Middle East for themselves. This mostly went according to plan, the Middle East was carved up into regions for the benefit of the Allies; not very democratic.



        As for the Turks, point XII promised...




        XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.




        Instead there was a plan to carve up Anatolia with "zones of influence" and outright annexations leaving about a third of the territory for the Turks. The Turks strenuously objected to this plan that nobody consulted them about and won their independence by fighting the Allies who wanted to carve them up.



        Finally, some colonies took point V to heart.




        V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.




        Most famously Hi Chi Minh arrived at the Versailles Peace Conference asking for independence from France for Vietnam. He was ignored and two generations of the Indochinese would suffer for it.







        share|improve this answer














        share|improve this answer



        share|improve this answer








        edited 1 hour ago

























        answered 1 hour ago









        SchwernSchwern

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